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Abstract 
Poverty monitoring through household surveys in the period 1996-2003 did not reveal poverty 
reduction in rural areas. At the same time poverty reduction in urban areas especially in the capital 
was significant. This paper attempts to contribute to a better understanding of the factors behind 
persisting rural poverty in Armenia. Rural poverty in Armenia has been largely stagnant in the 
context of continuous growth in agriculture as rural farm incomes did not respond to the growing 
agricultural value-added. Further, negative relative price shocks may have held back agricultural 
growth significantly below the level of economic growth, thus impeding its potential to reduce 
rural poverty. Incomes from non-farm employment of rural households failed to increase while the 
growing state benefits and remittances were insufficient to serve as a safeguard from poverty. We 
use the data available from household surveys, national statistics as well as expert estimations to 
examine the factors impeding rural poverty reduction.  
 
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Armenian International Policy Research Group. Working Papers describe 
research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Rural poverty in Armenia has been largely stagnant during the recent years, while urban poverty 
did decline. As a result, while in the 90-s urban poverty used to be much more severe than rural 
poverty, in the 00-s rural poverty proved to be a more persistent phenomenon hardly responding to 
the positive trends in the economy in general and agricultural growth in particular.  The purpose of 
this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the factors behind persisting rural poverty in 
Armenia. For that we will try to focus on the main issues around this problem, using the data from 
Household surveys conducted in 1996-2003, national statistics as well as expert estimations.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly describe the problem, presenting the main 
statistics indicative of the trends in rural poverty. In the following section the available data are 
described and the main questions that we will attempt to answer in this paper are formulated.  
 
The fourth section focuses on the dynamics of farm incomes of rural households. Here we discuss 
the possible factors that may have lead rural farm incomes to decline in the context of growing 
agriculture. We focus on the role of commercialization of agriculture, involvement of urban 
households in farming and shifts in the value chain of agricultural goods.  
 
In the fifth section we reflect on the speculation that agricultural growth has not been high enough 
to have lead to a reduction of rural poverty. We analyze the factors that may have held back 
agricultural growth thus limiting its potential to reduce rural poverty. We consider the unfavorable 
relative food price dynamics as a factor holding back agricultural growth. Further we consider the 
impact of relative food price changes on the rural poor.   
 
In the sixth section we explore the questions to what extent the continuous rapid economic growth 
trickled down to rural households through non-farm income and to what extent state benefits and 
private transfers served as a safeguard from poverty for rural households. 
 
The final seventh section focuses on the growing regional disparities in poverty and tries to explain 
them by the extremely uneven agricultural growth.   
 
 
2. The problem 
 
The results of household surveys in the period 1996-2003 indicate around 12 percentage point 
reduction in the poverty incidence on the national level. The elasticity of poverty reduction in 
respect to growth in Armenia has been one of the lowest in developing countries: 6 percent annual 
real economic growth against 1 percentage point reduction of poverty. This reduction in poverty 
has been driven by improvement in urban areas, especially in the capital, while poverty in rural 
areas has not changed. Yerevan, other cities and rural areas account for around one third of the 
sample of the Household Survey, however out of the 11.8 percentage points reduction in poverty 
around 9.4 is coming from improvements in Yerevan, 2.2 percentage points are contributed by 
other cities and only 0.2 percentage points by rural areas. The Yerevan-centered improvement has 
basically changed the nature of poverty: while in the mid 90-s poverty was predominantly an urban 
phenomenon, in the recent years poverty in Armenia started to take the common shapes for 
developing countries with rural poverty significantly exceeding urban poverty.  
 
Table 1: Poverty profile, 1996-2003, (percent) 
  1996 1999 2001 2002 2003 
Armenia 54.7 55.1 50.9 49.7 42.9 
Urban poverty 58.8 58.3 51.9 52.6 39.7 
   Yerevan 58.2 56.6 46.7 43.8 29.6 
Rural poverty 48 50.8 48.7 45.3 47.5 
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  Source: NSS 
 
The household surveys (HS) revealed a growing disparity of average incomes between urban and 
rural areas. Nominal total incomes on the national level increased by around 46 percent over the 
period 19991-2003 with 90 percent nominal increase in urban areas and only 7 percent increase in 
rural areas. This is an extremely modest increase, especially when taken into account that CPI 
inflation was around 15 percent for that period. As table 2 shows, the main reason for the low 
growth of rural household incomes is the significant decline of farm income (income from sales of 
agricultural products and consumption of food from own farm) for the period of 1999-2003, a 
development that is difficult to interpret in the context of growth in the agricultural sector. Rural 
households also lag behind in respect of increase in incomes from self-employment and hired job. 
 
Table 2: Dynamics of average monthly per capita income, Armenian drams  
Armenia Urban Rural 
  1999 2003 
Percent 
change 1999 2003 
Percent 
change 1999 2003 
Percent 
change 
Total income 10,761 15,697 46 8,765 16,653 90 13,416 14,313 7 
  Total monetary income 7,929 13,324 68 7,397 15,647 112 8,636 9,960 15 
Hired job 1,948 5,487 182 2,814 7,985 184 796 1,870 135 
Self-employment 842 1,868 122 796 2,439 206 903 1,041 15 
Sale of agricultural products 2,546 1,691 -34 165 628 281 5,715 3,232 -43 
State pensions and benefits 740 1,321 79 894 1,236 38 532 1,447 172 
Private transfers 1,532 2,113 38 2,285 2,325 2 529 1,807 242 
Other incomes 321 844 163 443 1,035 134 161 563 250 
  Non-monetary income 2,832 2,373 -16 1,368 1,006 -26 4,780 4,353 -9 
    Consumption of food from own farm 2,652 2,195 -17 1,155 755 -35 4,643 4,281 -8 
    Free non-food products and services 180 178 -1 213 251 18 137 72 -47 
Source: NSS 
 
Our final contemplation is on the regional picture of poverty. Behind the largely stagnant rural 
poverty during 1999-2003, the regional data indicate significant and growing disparities of poverty 
situation across the country. In six of the regions - Ararat, Aragatsotn, Armavir, Gegharkuniq, 
Vayots Dzor, Tavush (not highlighted in Table 3) more than two thirds of the population lives in 
rural areas and these regions account for around two thirds of rural population of Armenia. In the 
context of non-decreasing rural poverty in the country, there were improvements in Ararat, Tavush 
and Vayots Dzor, while in Aragatsotn, Armavir and Gegharkuniq the situation deteriorated.  
 
Table 3: Poverty profile across the regions (percent) 
  1996 1999 2001 2002 2003 
   Aragatsotn 51.1 57 60.3 72.1 57 
   Ararat 54.2 49.4 44.7 45.4 42.8 
   Armavir 38.1 36.7 53.7 51.6 48.3 
   Gegharkuniq 48.1 43.4 62.2 47.2 59.9 
   Lori 51.5 61.7 54.2 44.6 34 
   Kotayq 62.4 60.3 50.5 55.9 52.5 
   Shirak 63.1 77.3 57.8 73.6 72.2 
   Syuniq 47.1 50 NA 32.7 34.6 
   Vayots Dzor 61.5 34.7 51.1 53.2 42.9 
   Tavush 56.1 27.6 59.7 48.2 30.7 
                                       Source: NSS 
 
                                                     
1 Since HS 1996 is not fully comparable with later surveys HS 1999 will mostly be used as a starting data point in this 
paper. 
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In summary, the HS results point to the problem of stagnant rural poverty in Armenia.  The 
continuous high economic growth, including growth in the agricultural sector failed to reduce rural 
poverty while the improvement in urban areas seems apparent. Also, the survey results reveal a 
problem of regional disparities.  
 
 
3. Data and Analysis   
 
Poverty monitoring through household surveys started in 1996 and five surveys were conducted 
since then. However the following reasons make the results of the household surveys not strictly 
comparable: the 1996 survey used a notably different methodology compared to the subsequent 
surveys; the 98-99 survey covered a 12 month period over two years; only summary data are 
available for the 2003 survey. To make the regional analysis more credible we would need 
representative data on rural and urban households for each region, which, however, are not 
provided by the household surveys. These data constraints will unfortunately limit the accuracy of 
our research. Besides the HS data we use various data from national statistics as well as the results 
of the social monitoring survey conducted by UNDP. 
 
We organize the analysis of the main factors behind persistent rural poverty in Armenia into a 
discussion of several key questions. We start by the question why rural households failed to benefit 
from the growth in agriculture and try to answer this question by considering the factors 
influencing farm incomes of rural households. The second question is whether agricultural growth 
itself was high enough to bring about a reduction of rural poverty and what factors limited this 
potential. The third question is whether economic growth has trickled down to rural areas through 
non-farm income. We also consider the behavior of public and private transfers to see whether 
they helped rural households to escape poverty. Finally we try to explain the possible factors 
behind regional disparities of rural poverty.     
 
The data constraints make it unfeasible to construct models to test hypotheses on the factors 
impeding rural poverty reduction. In case the major data constraints are resolved a more thorough 
quantitative analysis can be done to substantiate the theories underlined here.  
 
 
4. Farm Income of Rural Households versus General Pattern of Agriculture 
 
This section focuses on the question why the growth in agricultural sector has not transformed to 
growth in farm income of rural households. 
 
The most marked feature of rural incomes is the importance of farm income component in the 
structure of rural households’ total income. In 2003 the sum of monetary income from the sales of 
agricultural goods and consumption of food products of own production accounted for around 53 
percent of the total income of rural households. It was even higher in previous years: 77 percent in 
1999 and in 59 percent 2001. As Table 4 below shows, farm income has been extremely volatile 
and its decline in the period 1999-2003 could be deep enough to be responsible for the persistence 
of rural poverty. 
 
Table 4. Monthly per capita farm incomes 
  Armenia 
  1999 2001 2002 2003 
2003 against 1999, 
percent change 
 Total farm income 5,198 4,237 3,429 3,886 -25 
of which: Income from sale of agricultural products 2,546 1,754 626 1,691 -34 
Consumption of food from own farm 2,652 2,483 2,803 2,195 -17 
  Urban 
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 Total farm income 1,320 1,582 1,578 1,383 5 
of which: Income from sale of agricultural products 165 105 147 628 281 
Consumption of food from own farm 1,155 1,477 1,431 755 -35 
  Rural 
 Total farm income 10,358 9,695 6,148 7,513 -27 
of which: Income from sale of agricultural products 5,715 5,144 1,329 3,232 -43 
Consumption of food from own farm 4,643 4,551 4,819 4,281 -8 
      
Source: NSS 
 
The household survey data point up that the role of farm income as a safeguard from poverty is 
becoming less and less important. Although agricultural activities still help to secure the minimum 
of food consumption keeping extreme poverty in rural areas lower as compared to urban areas, 
still, households relying on farm income are at a higher risk of poverty. This argument is supported 
by data on regional level, which show that there is a positive correlation between the share of farm 
income in total household income and increases in poverty incidence in the six predominantly rural 
regions of Armenia. 
        
Chart 1 
The importance of farm income for rural households (x) versus change in poverty incidence (y)
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Another important observation on farm income is its changing distribution o across income 
deciles. As shown in Table 6 below, it has changed dramatically: while in 1999-2001 the well-
being of households was positively correlated with farm income and farm income used to 
contribute almost half of the incomes of the richest group, implying mostly rural households being 
on the top of income distribution, by 2003 this pattern radically shifted. HS 2003 results indicate 
that, the highest deciles lost the bulk of their farm income, which led to a more even distribution of 
farm income. The data in table 5 illustrate that an average rural household in the top quintile lost 
around 90 percent of its farm income, and only half of this loss was compensated by gains in the 
first four quintiles while the other half disappeared.  
 
Table 5:  The share of farm income by deciles, 1999 and 2003, percent 
  Deciles I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
  1999 5 11 14 15 18 15 21 20 28 46 
  2003 44 35 25 23 15 14 11 6 5 2 
Source: NSS 
 
It is important to understand the main reasons behind the extreme volatility of farm income. The 
household survey results show that in 2003 rural families were getting 27.5 percent less in incomes 
from sale of agricultural goods than in 1999. At the same time national accounts statistics report 
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continuous positive growth of agriculture. Nominal value added in agriculture increased by 20.2 
percent over the period 1998/19992-2003.  
 
In the remainder of this section we will try to explain why in spite of continuous agricultural 
growth3 rural farm income has not grown, and moreover has fallen significantly. Our objective is 
to identify the possible factors that may have lead rural farm incomes to decline in the context of 
growing agriculture. We focus on the role of commercialization of agriculture, involvement of 
urban households in farming and shifts in the value chain of agricultural goods. The factors that we 
examine are roughly quantifiable, which will allow to estimate a combined effect of these factors 
on the gap between rural households farm income and total value added in agriculture. 
 
 
4.1 Commercialization of Agriculture 
 
The increasing role of commercial firms in production of agricultural products may have driven 
some of rural households out of business thus becoming a factor behind declining farm incomes of 
rural households in the context of the continuous real growth in agriculture. Commercialization of 
agriculture is believed to increase the inequality of farm income distribution as households 
engaged in farming can be put out of business by commercial firms. The incomes that could be 
received by the members of rural households employed in these firm would not be classified as 
farm income in the HS results, but would probably appear in the categories “income from hired 
job” or other.  
 
Table 6:  The share of commercial organizations in total agricultural production, percent 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 Share of commercial organizations in agricultural output, percent 0.8 0.9 1.5 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.8 
  of which in planting, percent 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.8 
             in animal husbandry, percent 0.7 0.7 1.7 3.4 5.9 6.2 6.2 
Source: NSS 
 
There is some statistical evidence that commercialization of agriculture has been increasing in the 
recent years.  In Table 6 above the ratios of commercial organizations in the agricultural output are 
given. Data on the share of commercial organizations in the value added unfortunately are not 
available. However, we can argue that the share of commercial organizations in the agricultural 
value added would be higher than their share in agricultural output. The rationale is that normally 
commercial firms do better than households in terms of productivity, bargaining power in input 
and output markets and market positioning, e.g. proximity to food processing companies. 
Nevertheless, the ratio of commercial organizations in food production, although increasing, 
remains rather low. This leads us to believe that commercialization of agriculture could not have 
been a major factor behind declining farm incomes of rural households and the losses for rural 
households from the commercialization can be estimated at 3-4 percent4
 
 
4.2 Involvement of Urban Population in Farming  
 
A more extensive involvement of urban population in farming could have caused a redistribution 
of farm income in favor of urban households and at the expense of rural households. The HS data 
indicate that urban households have in fact become relatively more involved in agricultural 
production. While in 1999 urban households used to receive only 10 percent of monetary incomes 
                                                     
2 Since 1998/1999 survey covers the period between July 1998-June 1999, we compare  the value added in agriculture 
for this period with 2003. 
3 The speculation that agricultural growth has not been sufficiently high to have an impact on rural poverty will be 
considered in the next section. 
4 Taking into account that the change of the share of commercial organizations in agricultural output in 1997-2003 was 3 
percentage points. 
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from farming, in 2003 they received around 25 percent of incomes from the sale of agricultural 
goods. As for the total farm income that includes food consumption from own farms, in 1999 
urban households had a 15 percent share in total and in 2003 their share reached 21 percent.  
             
            Chart 2 Composition of total farm income, 1999 and 2003 (percents) 
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               Source: NSS 
 
Yet there is no sufficient evidence to argue that these increases in urban households’ farm incomes 
have negatively affected the incomes of rural population. There was hardly any absolute increase 
in farm incomes of urban households in the period 1999-2003, rather, they could manage to keep 
their farm incomes at roughly the same level, while rural households lost almost one third of it.  
 
A possible explanation of this difference is that urban households may have benefited from more 
dynamic structural changes. As chart 2 and table 4 above show not only the share of urban 
households in total farm income increased but also the composition of farm income of urban 
households changed significantly. Consumption of food produced at own farm by urban 
households declined and the ratio of goods sold in the market significantly increased.  
 
This may suggest that some urban households have been able to shift from subsistence farming to 
specialization in a few crops, thus becoming more marketable. At the same time rural households 
lack the positive trends in specialization and in contrast to urban households their farm output was 
increasingly going to own consumption. Further, looking closer at the decile data of urban farm 
incomes we can see that these urban households specializing in agriculture were concentrated 
almost in the top decile (see chart 3 below), for which the income from sales of agricultural 
products jumped radically in 2003 as compared to 2001.  
 
  Chart 3 Monthly income from sale of agricultural product of urban households across deciles, 
drams        
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Another possible scenario is that due to land transactions or land leasing rural households lost a 
fraction of their farm income while the resulting new incomes to urban households appeared not as 
“income from sale of agricultural goods” but as incomes from self-employment or as other 
incomes. The data from HS do not allow testing this idea, however, data on real estate transactions 
show that there has been no significant amount of land transfers (including both sales and leasing) 
in recent years. This limits the validity of assumptions on the social mobility through land 
transactions within rural areas and between rural and urban areas. 
 
 
4.3 Distribution of Gains along the Value Chain of Agricultural Products  
 
The evidence from price statistics shows that the gap between gate-prices of farmers and retail 
market prices for some food products has been increasing during the recent years. This can 
potentially affect the distribution of income along the value chain of agricultural products5. To 
estimate the aggregate impact of this phenomenon on farm income we constructed a basket of the 
main goods, for which price statistics are available. These goods cover 75 to 80 percent of total 
agricultural output and the base year of this exercise is 19986. We derived the aggregate impact of 
the gate-price versus retail price developments using the formula: Σi=1N (Gi98/Ri98 - 
Git/Rit)*AOit/TAOt where G-s are the gate prices for the i-th agricultural product (i=1:N) in the 
year 1998 and in subsequent years (t=1999:2003), R-s are the corresponding retail prices, AOit is 
the output of the i-th sector and TAOt is the total agricultural output of the examined main 
agricultural products. The data show that the gap expressed by this formula has been widening in 
the period 1999-2003 with a peak in 2002 at 3.2 percent of total agricultural production. In 2003, 
the gap somewhat narrowed to 2.8 mainly due to the prices of fruits, grapes and meat. In general, 
the prices contributing to the increase of the gap are those of potatoes, vegetables and milk, while 
the prices contributing to the narrowing of the gap are those of fruits and meat.  
 
This variation among different agricultural products may have regional implications. The regions 
specialized mostly in fruits and meat may have benefited from the shifts in the value chain while 
regions specializing in potatoes and vegetables may have lost. However, since most regions 
producing meat are also milk producers and the price gaps of these two products exhibit opposite 
trends aggregate regional data analysis does not allow calculating the impact of this factor on farm 
incomes of rural households in different regions. 
 
There could be various explanations behind this widening gap between gate-prices of farmers and 
retail market prices. The most important ones probably are the following: increasing role of trade 
intermediation; less labor on the sales of products by farmers themselves and losses in the 
                                                     
5 See Max Spoor (2004), Land Reform, Rural Poverty and Inequality: A Pro-Poor Approach to Land Policies 
6 The quality of price statistics does not allow covering earlier periods. 
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bargaining power of farmers; increasing indirect taxation in retail market, which puts a pressure on 
gate-prices.  
 
Based on the above estimates of the scope of the impact of commercialization, increasing 
involvement of urban households in farming and increasing gap between gate-prices and retail 
prices we can conclude that these factors together can account for a total of up to 13 percentage 
points7 of the aggregate loss of farming incomes for rural households. However, this is only a 
fraction of the approximately 40-percent shortfall of farm incomes of rural households relative to 
general performance of agriculture. The reason why we cannot fully explain the shortfall of farm 
income can also be statistical, i.e. HS may fail to adequately capture the dynamic of farm income, 
presumably omitting the farm incomes of the richest rural deciles.  
  
 
5. Agricultural Growth and Relative Price Developments 
 
In the previous section we tried to analyze the main reasons behind the large discrepancy between 
the growth recorded in the agricultural sector and the farm incomes of rural households. These 
discrepancies imply that rural households fail to effectively capture the benefits of agricultural 
growth. This section focuses on the question whether the growth in agriculture was high enough to 
reduce rural poverty. We will analyze the factors that may have held back agricultural growth thus 
limiting its potential to reduce rural poverty.  
 
In the period 1999-2003 the cumulative real growth of agriculture was around 21 percent, while 
GDP grew at 55 percent. As a result the share of agriculture in GDP fell significantly from 31 
percent in 1998 to 24 percent in 2003, estimated in constant prices of 1998. Additionally, 
agriculture suffered from unfavorable relative price shocks in late 90s and early 2000s, which 
brought the share of agriculture in GDP in nominal terms to 21 percent by 2003, i.e. around 3 
percentage points lower than the share derived based on constant prices of 1998. Relative price 
deterioration was so severe, that in spite of around 21 percent real growth between 1998-2003, 
nominal value added in agriculture grew only by 17 percent. This meant not only a decline in the 
relative deflator, but also a negative absolute deflator for the agricultural sector. 
 
These developments of the relative position of agriculture in the economy were also reflected in 
the fluctuations of the domestic terms of trade for agriculture. In the period of 1997-20038, gate-
prices for agricultural goods declined by 1.5 percent, while the prices for agricultural inputs 
increased by 22.5 percent. Given that intermediate consumption makes up around 40 percent of the 
agricultural output, this disparity in input and output prices would mean an approximately 10 
percentage points negative shock to the value added created in agriculture. Agriculture suffered the 
most severe negative domestic terms of trade shock compared to the other sectors. This leads us to 
believe that unfavorable price dynamics and the lack of productivity growth that could compensate 
it have been the main factors holding back agricultural growth. 
 
5.1 The Dynamics of Agricultural Prices 
 
Most experts when discussing the developments of the recent years9 point to the unfavorable price 
developments for agriculture in 1998-2001. Still, not enough attention has been paid to the 
underlying factors behind these fluctuations of relative prices and to the relative price 
developments prior to 1998. In the context of this paper we want to extend the coverage of the 
                                                     
7 Estimated 3-4 percentage points from commercialization, up to 6 percentage points from more involvement of urban 
households in farming and 3 percentage points from the changes in value-chain. 
8 Statistics on prices of agricultural inputs and outputs begins at 1997. 
9 World Bank (2001), Armenia Growth Challenges and Government Policies; 
 Aghassi Mkrtchyan (2004), Impact of regulated price adjustments on price variability in a very low inflation transition 
economy: Case of Armenia. 
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analysis of relative food price dynamics to include the period 1990-2003 and thus to offer a longer-
term overview on what happened with food prices.  
 
According to the conventional view the increase of the share of agriculture in GDP in early 90s 
(reaching to almost 50 percent of GDP by 1993 was due to the fact that other sectors experienced 
sharper falls. However, relative price developments appear to be more important than the relative 
changes in real output. We did an exercise calculating the share of agriculture in GDP for the 
period 1990-2003 based on constant prices of 1990 and comparing them with the respective shares 
calculated using current prices. This comparison reveals the impact of the relative price 
fluctuations on agriculture versus the rest of the economy.  
  
Table 7. Comparison of the shares of agriculture in GDP by constant and current prices 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 (1) Share by constant prices, percent 15.8 17.5 27.5 28.4 27.8 27.0 26.0 24.1 25.3 24.9 23.2 23.7 21.7 19.9 
 (2) Share by current prices, percent  15.8 23.5 28.2 48.7 43.5 40.7 34.8 29.4 30.8 27.0 23.2 25.5 23.4 21.3 
 (3) Difference, (2) - (1) - 6.0 0.7 20.3 15.7 13.7 8.8 5.3 5.5 2.1 -0.0 1.8 1.7 1.4 
Source: NSS 
 
As shown in Table 7, only 13 percentage points of the total 33 percentage points increase of the 
share of agriculture in nominal GDP between 1990 and 1993 is explained by real output while the 
rest of the increase is due to relative price changes. In other words, without the help of growing 
relative prices for food agriculture would not reach a share in GDP higher than 28 percent. 
However, the situation started to change in mid 90s and by 2000 all the gain that agriculture sector 
was enjoying in early 90-s vanished.  
 
Summarizing, we can claim that in early 90s Armenia experienced a considerable jump in relative 
prices for food, which created favorable conditions for net food producers of food and accordingly 
net consumers of food had to bear the cost. Further, taking a long-term perspective, the decline of 
agricultural relative prices in 1998-2001 can be viewed as a return to the pre-transition level, 
which is probably closer to the longer-term equilibrium.  
 
Increasing relative prices for agriculture in early 90-s allowed the sector to sustain the large influx 
of laid-off workers from other sectors that resulted in decrease of labor productivity. Without the 
favorable price developments for agriculture in 1992-1994 the sector would not absorb the large 
labor influx. At the same time as agriculture was enjoying high relative prices the urgency to 
improve productivity could have been overlooked. Non-sufficient increase of productivity in the 
context of declining relative prices left the sector with lower incomes by end-90s and early 00-s.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the reasons of the dramatic fluctuations of relative 
prices, however, we will briefly focus on two aspects, namely trade liberalization and net indirect 
taxes. It has been extensively argued that the drastic decline of relative prices for agricultural 
goods since 1998 was largely due to “barriers to trade” and the resultant excess supply of 
agricultural goods in the domestic market. However, we believe that barriers to trade in early 90s 
had caused higher relative prices for agricultural goods, especially for the low value and high 
volume ones. While later, when the blockade was eased, international trade introduced more 
competition by late 90-s, which resulted in lower prices of food in line with the regional and 
international levels10. This assumption is in line with the evidence of worldwide decline of the 
food prices of late 90s.  
 
The last raw of Table 7 is the difference between the share of agriculture calculated using constant 
prices and current prices. This difference can be an indicator of relative prices of agricultural 
                                                     
10 In recent years we observe both growing exports and rising prices for a limited number of raw and processed 
agricultural products, namely grapes, some other fruits and certain dairy products. This can be explained in the 
framework of tradable versus non-tradable sectors: trade liberalization may have caused agriculture to become “more 
tradable” imposing lower prices for some products and higher prices for others. 
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goods versus goods and services produced in other sectors and, as illustrated in chart 3, it appears 
to be negatively correlated with net indirect taxes (indirect taxes minus subsidies).  
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Further analysis would be required to test the causality behind this correlation; however an 
intuitive explanation is that any increases in taxes and/or reduction of subsidies to other sectors can 
constrain the demand for agricultural goods. The implication for subsidies is that in early and mid 
90s subsidies to irrigation system were relatively high, which secured high value added for 
agriculture. When the subsidies started to diminish and net indirect taxes started to increase, 
agriculture could not maintain the same level of value added. 
 
 
5.2 Implications of Relative Agricultural Prices for Rural Poverty 
 
The impact of relative prices for food on poverty is a largely debated issue. Since rural poor in 
many developing nations are not necessarily net-producers of food, increasing relative prices for 
food are often seen as a negative shock for rural poverty as much as for urban poverty11. Contrary 
to many developing nations, the vast majority of rural households in Armenia own land plots and 
their probability for being net food producers is quite high. If most of the rural poor are net 
producers of food than declining relative prices helping urban households can hurt rural 
households.  
 
The impact of relative price changes on average rural and urban households can be illustrated by 
considering the dynamics of the poverty line. The poverty line that is being used for poverty 
assessment in Armenia is based on a food basket12 and is being annually adjusted for changes of 
prices in its components. Over the period 1999-2003 the value of the poverty line increased only 
by 17 percent while CPI increased by 34 percent. This difference implies that urban households are 
better positioned, at least statistically, as their nominal incomes were increasing much faster than 
their expenditures on food. Contrary to this, rural households get the largest part of their income 
from farming and the decline in relative food prices negatively affects their well-being.  
 
However, while the positive association between rural farm income and agricultural prices is 
straightforward for an average rural household, the implications for the rural poor will depend on 
the extent the rural poor are net consumers or net producers of food. According to the HS data for 
1999-2001, an average rural household used to be a net producer of food as the sum of 
consumption of food from own farm and the income from sale of agricultural products exceeded 
the expenditures on food products. The picture changed in 2002-2003, as the average rural 
household became a net consumer of food. However, the decile distribution of incomes suggests 
                                                     
11 See e.g. Caurav Datt and martin Ravallion, Farm productivity and rural poverty in India(1998), The Journal of 
Development Studies, April 1998, 34, 4 
12 The general poverty basket is derived by simply multiplying the food basket with a constant coefficient of 1.64. 
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that this shift was largely due to the changes in the top deciles as their food consumption increased 
while their farm income dropped significantly (Chart 5). At the same time the low-middle deciles 
started to get more in farm incomes. The cumulative distribution of farm income across deciles is 
illustrated in the chart below.   
 
Chart 5 Monthly income from sale of agricultural product of rural households across deciles, 
drams 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2001 Survey 2003 Survey
 
 
In order to answer the question, which portion of rural poor are net producers of food we would 
need the data at household level, which unfortunately are not available for the 2003 survey.  
 
6. The Dynamics of Non-farm Incomes of Rural Households  
 
In this section we will explore to what extent the continuous rapid economic growth trickled down 
to rural households through non-farm income and to what extent public transfers and remittances 
could serve as a safety net for rural households. Non-farm incomes (i.e. total income reduced by 
the income from sale agricultural products and consumption of food from own farm) of rural 
households, increased at around 122 percent over the period 1999-2003, albeit having a small 
share in total incomes of rural households. This growth rate exceeded the national average of 112 
percent.   
 
Non-farm incomes consist generally of income from hired job and self employment on one hand 
and public and private transfers on the other hand. As the HS data show, these two groups of 
incomes exhibited opposing dynamics for rural versus urban households. Incomes form hired job 
and from self-employment have been the most dynamic ones in the structure of household income 
contributing a large share of the increase of urban households’ income. State benefits and private 
transfers, on the other hand increased much faster for rural households.  
 
 
6.1 Trickle-down of Economic Growth to Rural Areas  
 
As it is shown in Table 2 (see section 2) on the national level the growth of income from hired job 
and self-employment significantly exceeded the cumulative nominal economic growth over the 
same period. Due to these trends, the share of incomes from hired job and self-employment in total 
income significantly increased since 1999. According to HS 2003, incomes from hired job and 
self-employment together now account for around 55 percent of the monetary incomes of all 
households whereas this indicator was only 35 percent in 1999. 
 
The growth of incomes from hired job and self-employment was distributed very unevenly across 
urban and rural households. Having population of around 60 percent of the national total, urban 
households gained 89 percent of the growth of hired-job incomes leaving only 11 percent to rural 
households. In terms of incomes from self-employment, the distribution of the growth in the period 
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1999-2003 was even worse for rural households: they gained only 2 percent of the total growth of 
incomes from self-employment. Due to these developments, the share of rural households in total 
incomes from hired job and self-employment declined from 23 percent in 1999 to 15 percent in 
2003.  
 
Table 8:  Distribution of the income growth from hired job and self-employment across 
urban and rural households 
  Urban Rural Total 
  Distribution of the income growth from hired job between 1999-2003, percent    89.1     10.9    100 
  Distribution of the increased income from self-employment, percent    97.7       2.3    100 
  The share of hired job income and self employment in total, 1998    77       23    100 
  The share of hired job and self employment in total, 2003    85       15    100 
    
              Source: NSS 
 
These data lead us to conclude that trickle down of high economic growth of the recent years on 
rural areas has been very limited. In contrast, the fact that urban poverty did decline is an 
indication that the trickle down mechanism did work for urban households as their incomes 
increased by around 90 percent in the period 1999-2003 mostly driven by increased income from 
hired job and self employment.  
 
We consider the following possible reasons why the trickle down of growth through non-farm 
income was so insignificant in rural areas. First, non-increasing incomes from hired job and self-
employment may be the result of very limited opportunities for rural population in the non-farming 
sector. On the other hand the wages for the existing non-farming jobs do not increase in real terms, 
as the equilibrium wages in rural areas are influenced by the very low productivity in the farming 
sector. The recent increases in the public sector wages and in particular teachers’ wages probably 
account for a significant share of increased income from hired job. This suggests that in the rural 
private sector the wage increase was probably negligible.    
 
 
6.2 The Role of Public and Private Transfers  
 
Contrary to the distribution of incomes from hired job and self-employment, rural households 
gained the bulk of the increased state benefits and private transfers (see Table 9). The HS data on 
state benefits are consistent with the recent shifts in the budget social expenditures policies. During 
the recent years the family allowances scheme was continuously being amended to focus more on 
multi-children families and communities at unfavorable locations (near-border, remote and high 
altitude communities), most of these target groups normally live in rural areas.  
 
The dynamics of private transfers in the urban-rural context is difficult to interpret. The HS data 
show that urban households gained extremely little from the increasing private transfers, only 4 
percent of the total. A reason behind the larger increase of private transfers going to rural 
household could be that rural areas benefit more from increasing remittances from migrants and 
seasonal workers. 
           
Table 9:  Distribution of the income growth from hired job across urban and rural 
households 
  Urban Rural Total 
  Distribution of the increased income from state benefits, 
percent   35.9     64.1   100 
  Distribution of the increased income from private 
transfers, percent   4.2 95.8   100 
                       Source: NSS 
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These HS data may suggest that state benefits and private transfers are a survival tool for rural 
households to mitigate the negative impact of declining incomes from the sale of agricultural 
goods. However, these two items together could not be sufficient to compensate for the declining 
incomes from the sale of agricultural goods.  
 
 
7. Explaining Regional Disparities 
 
The factors behind regional disparities of rural poverty may be various13. Here we focus on the 
regional developments in agriculture. In the fourth section we argued that the declining farm 
income tends to lose its importance for well-being of rural households. However, looking closer at 
the regional picture, we see that in regions where farm income increased significantly, some 
positive developments in terms of poverty reduction were achieved.  
 
The cumulative growth rates of agriculture over the period 1999-2003 varied significantly across 
the 10 regions, ranging from negative 2 percent to positive 77 percent.  The disparities in the 
poverty indicators are also very large. Chart 5 shows that there is a negative relationship between 
the level of poverty and real agricultural growth in 1999-2003 in the ten regions of Armenia. This 
relationship remains strong when tested for the predominantly “rural” regions, excluding the four 
predominantly urban regions of Shirak, Lori, Syuniq and Kotayq. 
 
Chart 6 
The level of poverty (x) and change in real agricultural output between 1999-2003 (y)
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                       Source: NSS 
 
However, one needs to be careful interpreting the causality of this relationship. The fact that 
regions experiencing high growth in agriculture have lower poverty incidence may imply that 
agricultural growth has had a poverty reducing impact. However, another interpretation could be 
that poorer regions had worse opportunities expand production through new investments.  
 
Further, trying to explain the regional disparities in agricultural production, we consider the price 
differentials between production inputs and agricultural outputs. The prices for inputs and outputs 
of the agricultural sector significantly differ across the regions of Armenia reflecting different 
specializations by types of crops produced and inputs used for production in different regions. This 
variation implies that significantly different terms of trade are being faced by agricultural 
producers in different regions.   
 
                                                     
13 As assessed by the NSS, two of the most important factors increasing the risk of poverty are the average size of the 
household and the number of children in the household. However, in this paper we do not focus on these characteristics, 
based on the rationale that demographic indicators tend to be relatively stable and thus not very useful to explain the 
growing regional disparities.    
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Chart 7 
Change in real agricultural production (x) versus output/input price ratio (y)
Armavir
Vayots dzor
 Syuniq
Kotayq
Lori 
Tavush
 Ararat
 Gegharkuniq
 Aragatsotn
 Shirak
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80
 
         Source: NSS 
 
As Chart 6 suggests, there was positive relationship between the terms of trade ratio and real 
output in the period 1999-2003. Since most of the agricultural producers are price-takers, they had 
to largely absorb the terms of trade shocks. This in most cases affected the real growth rates of 
agricultural output in the regions facing deteriorating terms of trade, and possibly affected the level 
of rural poverty in these regions.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we tried to explore the factors that impede rural poverty reduction in Armenia. We 
organized our analysis into a few key questions, the possible answers to which were examined 
using data from Household surveys 1996-2003 as well as National statistics and expert estimates.  
 
We argued that rural households failed to capture a large part of the growth in the agricultural 
sector for the period of 1999-2003 - around 40 percent of the value added of agriculture. We 
discussed commercialization of agriculture, increased involvement of urban households in farming 
and the changes in the value chain of agricultural products as possible factors explaining why farm 
incomes could fall so short of the growth in agriculture. However, we concluded that these factors 
together could have had an impact equivalent to only 9-12 percent, which is only a fraction of the 
relative shortfall of farm incomes of rural households versus agriculture. Finding it difficult to 
identify other economic factors behind this shortfall we concluded that statistical problems, in 
particular, the failure of 2002 and 2003 household surveys to capture the incomes of the richest 
rural households could be a major reason.   
 
Next we discussed the possible factors holding back agricultural growth and thus impeding its 
potential to reduce rural poverty. We studied the relative price developments for agricultural 
products and concluded that they were a key factor behind the developments in the agricultural 
sector. In particular we concluded that agriculture experienced a dramatic domestic terms of trade 
shock and the growth in productivity was not substantial enough to mitigate its negative impact. 
Taking a longer-term perspective we showed that in early 90-s agricultural sector greatly benefited 
from a positive shock of relative food prices. While this positive price shock helped the sector to 
absorb the large influx of labor force from other sectors, the need for investment and productivity 
increase was overlooked which lead to severe difficulties in agriculture when the positive food 
price shock reversed in end 90-s, leaving the sector with lower incomes and the rural farmers at 
high poverty risk.  
 
Further, we discussed the role of non-farm income for rural households and concluded that the 
trickle-down of economic growth to rural areas through incomes from hired job and self-
employment was very insignificant. At the same time rural households gained the bulk of 
increased public benefits and private transfers, which became the main component in their income 
portfolio helping to mitigate however unable to compensate the impact of diminishing farm 
incomes. 
 
Finally, we considered the largely uneven performance of the agricultural sector as a possible 
factor behind increasing regional disparities in rural poverty and showed that poverty risk is 
negatively correlated with growth in agricultural production. Also, we compared the terms of trade 
faced by rural farmers in different regions and found that they are important in explaining the large 
variation of agricultural growth across regions.   
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